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We measure the total-risk-adjusted (as opposed to factor-risk-adjusted) performance of hedge 
fund indices in well-diversified portfolios. Alpha is defined as the difference between, on the 
one hand, the average return on a mean-variance efficient portfolio containing exclusively 
traditional market assets (such as stocks and bonds) and, on the other hand, the average 
return on a mean-variance efficient portfolio containing traditional market assets and the new 
asset (such as a hedge fund index), where both portfolios carry the same risk. Alpha is 
conditioned on this risk level. Outlier-robust mean-variance efficient portfolios are 
constructed by using Minimum Volume Ellipsoid (MVE) estimates of location and scatter. 
We find that, between July 1995 and December 2005, the broad Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge 
index did not deliver statistically significant alpha.   3
1. Introduction 
 
Hedge funds are sometimes described as “unregulated and opaque investment partnerships 
that engage in a variety of active investment strategies” (Chan et al. 2005, p. 1). In this 
definition, the distinction between hedge funds and traditional investment companies, such as 
mutual funds, pension funds etc., is basically reduced to two features: Firstly, hedge funds 
are lightly regulated and, as a consequence, lightly supervised. Secondly, hedge funds are 
opaque because they seldom report their investment strategies and positions to investors, not 
even to investors in their own fund, let alone to the general public. So far, hedge funds have 
largely avoided regulatory oversight by targeting mainly high net worth individuals and 
institutional investors. Yet, this has not prevented the industry from growing. Between 2000 
and 2005, assets under management of hedge funds have doubled and now exceed $ 1 
trillion. The seminal article of Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) provides a full 
description of hedge fund characteristics. 
 
Interestingly, the definition above does not make any reference to what hedge funds 
themselves advocate; that their alternative investment approach leads to superior returns, 
which are little correlated to the traditional markets such as the stock market. Superiority is 
broadly defined by the ability to generate a higher return than expected on traditional long 
only stock and bond investment strategies, while not taking more risk. 
 
It is common practice to measure excess performance of hedge funds by alpha, which is a 
constant added to the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Lintner (1965), 
Mossin (1965) and Sharpe (1964) or a constant in a multi-factor model based on the 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) introduced by Ross (1976). Under the CAPM assumptions, 
additional expected return on a portfolio could only be obtained by additional risk taking, i.e. 
by choosing portfolios with a higher beta, i.e. a higher sensitivity to the market portfolio. 
Similarly, in exact factor pricing models, the expected return is determined by the multiple 
risk factors only. Alpha is the portion of the average portfolio return that could not be 
explained by the risk factors included in the APT or CAPM equation. However, alpha is not 
a proper measure of risk-free excess return since the unexplained volatility of returns is not 
taken into account (Schneeweis, 1999). 
 
We measure excess performance of hedge funds differently by taking into account both the 
explained and unexplained part of return volatility as far as captured by the variance of the 
portfolio returns. In this study, alpha is defined as the difference between, on the one hand, 
the average return on a mean-variance efficient portfolio containing exclusively traditional 
market assets (such as stocks and bonds), and, on the other hand, the average return on a 
mean-variance efficient portfolio containing traditional market assets and the new asset (such 
as a hedge fund index), where both portfolios carry the same risk. Alpha is conditioned on 
this risk level. Hence, in contrast with alpha in the CAPM or APT model, the benefit of our 
approach is that it reveals at which risk levels hedge funds under or over-perform traditional 
investment strategies. 
 
We use the Credit Suisse/Tremont broad hedge fund index as a measure for the performance 
of the hedge fund industry in the aggregate. By virtue of the central limit theorem, indices of 
hedge fund returns are usually closer to the normal distribution than individual hedge fund 
returns. That said, our results in section 2 show that, in comparison to the normal 
distribution, most of the Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund return indices also display excess 
of kurtosis and asymmetry. In most cases this is due to a few outlying, i.e. extreme,   4
observations. Chan and Lakonishik (1992) propose to use outlier-robust estimation 
techniques to achieve efficiency gains when estimating beta-risk under non-normality. We 
construct outlier-robust mean-variance efficient portfolios by weighing each observation 
according to its distance to the Minimum Volume Ellipsoid (MVE) estimate of the centre of 
the corresponding return series. By giving less weight to a few outliers, most of the hedge 
fund and traditional indices are transformed into normal return series, which makes it 
possible to apply the mean-variance optimisation framework. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is that it measures the total-risk-adjusted performance of 
hedge fund indices in well-diversified portfolios. Most studies so far have presented factor-
risk-adjusted performance and the Sharpe ratio of individual indices. The former 
performance measure ignores unexplained return volatility whereas the latter performance 
measure ignores potential portfolio diversification benefits. 
 
We find that, between July 1995 and December 2005, the broad Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge 
index did not deliver significant alpha. Some of the Credit Suisse/Tremont sub-indices, 
which show the average return of a group of hedge funds pursuing a particular investment 
strategy, delivered significant alpha between July 1995 and September 2000, but none of 
them kept up with their excess performance in the five years that followed. These results are 
aligned with those of Fung et al. (2006), who find that, over approximately the same sample 
period, the average fund-of-hedge-funds only showed factor-risk-adjusted excess 
performance between October 1998 and March 2000. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a descriptive analysis of the data 
and discusses possible selection biases, outlier treatment, and the normality of hedge fund 
indices. Section 3 explains how we measure risk-adjusted performance, i.e. alpha. Section 4 
contains estimates of alpha for the hedge fund industry in the aggregate and for ten broad 
groups of hedge fund investment styles. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Sample selection bias, outliers, and descriptive statistics 
 
2.1 The data 
 
Our dataset consists of 126 monthly observations for 11 Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund 
return indices and 9 traditional market return indices covering the period July 1995 – 
December 2005. The hedge fund indices include the broad hedge fund index and ten sub-
indices representing different hedge fund strategies: convertible arbitrage, dedicated short 
bias, emerging markets, equity market neutral, event driven, fixed income arbitrage, global 
macro, long/short equity, managed futures and multi-strategy.
1 The internet-site 
www.hedgeindex.com gives a brief description of these strategies. The traditional market 
indices include the S&P 500 index, the S&P 400 midcap index, the S&P 600 smallcap index, 
the Technology PSE-ArcaEx Tech 100 index, a Bloomberg real estate investment trust index, 
the S&P/IFC emerging market index, a Bloomberg US Treasury 3-months bill total return 
index, a Bloomberg US Treasury 10-year bond total return index, and a Bloomberg US 
industrial 10-year Baa1-rated bond total return index. Hence, the selected traditional indices 
cover stock markets for small, medium and large firms, stock markets for firms using 
innovative technologies, real estate stock markets, emerging stock markets, and parts of the 
                                                       
1 A multi-strategy fund pursues more than one of the mentioned strategies. We note that funds-of-hedge-funds 
(i.e. hedge funds that invest in other hedge funds) are excluded.   5
US corporate and sovereign bond markets. Table A1 of the annex shows the Bloomberg 
ticker codes of the used series. 
 
The Credit Suisse/Tremont index universe contains about 900 hedge funds, which voluntarily 
report their performance to the Credit Suisse/Tremont database. To be included in the index 
universe, funds need to have a minimum of US $50 million in (net) assets under management 
(AUM), a minimum one-year track record, and current audited financial statements. The 
broad index includes funds worldwide, is asset-weighted, re-selects hedge funds on a 
quarterly basis, and is computed and re-balanced monthly. 
 
The hedge fund indices show returns net of management fees, incentive fees, and other fund 
expenses. On average, hedge funds charge about 1% of AUM in annual management fees 
and skim about 20% of the annual profit once profits surpass some hurdle rate (Ackermann et 
al. 1999).  
 
2.2 Potential biases in hedge fund indices 
 
Some studies have warned against a number of potential selection biases in hedge fund 
indices because reporting by hedge funds is done on a voluntary basis (see, among others, 
Fung and Hsieh, 2000). As a consequence, the indices may lead to a distorted view of the 
true performance of the hedge fund industry due to, for instance, backfill bias, survivorship 
bias, and look-ahead bias. 
 
Backfill bias may arise when an incomplete set of returns (e.g. the best months of 
performance) of a hedge fund made before the first of month of reporting (to the hedge fund 
database) are included in the database. Early years of hedge fund databases are thought to 
contain most of the backfilled data. We exclude the first 20 observations, i.e. the first one-
and-a-half year of data, available in the Credit Suisse/Tremont index universe, which covers 
hedge fund returns from January 1994. Therefore, backfill bias is likely to be limited for our 
dataset. 
 
Excluding failed companies from the performance analysis may lead to survivorship bias. 
Survivorship bias may also occur when a fund stops reporting to the database while the fund 
does not cease its operations. Funds that are in the process of liquidation are kept in the 
Credit Suisse/Tremont index universe as long as financial statements are available in order to 
reduce survivorship bias. Moreover, past index values are not revised once funds in the index 
universe are liquidated. Therefore, the Credit Suisse/Tremont index method avoids 
survivorship bias as much as possible. 
 
Look-ahead bias may occur when information is used that would not be available when 
predictions are made. According to Baquero, Horst and Verbeek (2004), look-ahead bias 
arises because the index universe is conditioned on survival of funds over a number of 
consecutive months. In this case, the look-ahead bias is a particular form of survivorship 
bias. Baquero, Horst and Verbeek (2004) find that look-ahead bias in annual performance 
can be as large as 3.8 percentage points for some funds in the Trading Advisors Selection 
System (TASS) database, which is the main source for the Credit Suisse/Tremont database. 
However, the average bias in one-quarter returns is only 0.15 percentage point. Since our 
dataset contains monthly returns of hedge fund indices, look-ahead bias is expected to be 
minimal. 
   6
Ackermann et al. (1999) find that positive selection biases, such as the survivorship bias, 
may be offset by a negative selection bias. Well-established funds, which often outperform 
the less well-known (often younger) funds, may not need to report to hedge fund databases to 
attract investors. Indeed, some of the largest hedge funds do not report to any public 
database. 
 
Our dataset covers at best about 15% of all hedge funds worldwide. Evidently, only to the 
extent that this is a representative sample of funds, the results of our analysis will hold at the 




A second problem that complicates hedge fund performance analysis is the relatively 
frequent occurrence of extreme returns. Figure 1 below shows that the monthly return on the 
broad hedge index was as high (low) as about 8% (-8%) in some months, whereas the 
average monthly return over the period 1995-2005 was 1% with a standard deviation of 
2.3%. These outliers may distort alpha and need to be accommodated to ensure that the 
results are not dominated by a few observations. 
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where  t RD  is the robust distance of return  t r  of period t to the centre (location) of the return 
vector. Notice that only observations with a robust distance exceeding the 97.5
th percentile of 
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2 χ  distribution are identified as outliers and receive weights less than unity.   7
Application of the weight function in (1) is adequate when the majority of the returns 
represent the normal distribution. The robust distances  t RD  are computed by inserting the 
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MVE estimates are obtained with the re-sampling algorithm of Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987) 
and by applying the correction factor presented in Hinloopen and Wagenvoort (1997). 
 
In comparison to the selected traditional market indices, most of the Credit Suisse/Tremont 
hedge fund indices contain more and bigger outliers. Table A2 of the annex shows that, in the 
case of traditional market indices, the number of observations receiving a weight less than 
unity varies from 0 (US Treasury bill) to 5 (PSE-ArcaEx Tech 100, Real estate, S&P/IFC 
emerging market and US industrial Baa1 bond) whereas in the case of the hedge fund indices 
it varies from 1 (Global macro) to 18 (Fixed income arbitrage). Thus, for example, weighing 
was not required in the case of the US Treasury bill index because no outliers were found. 
The minimum of the weights (computed for each series separately) varies, in the case of 
traditional market indices, from 0.44 (S&P/IFC emerging market) to 1 (US Treasury bill) 
whereas in the case of hedge fund indices it varies from 0.16 (Fixed income arbitrage) to 0.80 
(Managed futures). Hence, extreme events affect hedge fund indices more often than 
traditional market indices, and have a larger impact on the former than the latter. 
 
Figure 1 above reveals, in addition to the presence of outliers, a structural break in monthly 
returns towards the end of the year 2000. During the period 1995-2000, hedge fund returns 
were relatively volatile in comparison to the period 2001-2005. One may expect alpha to 
differ between these two periods since hedge funds may have changed investment strategies 
and their use of leverage. Therefore, besides the full sample analysis, we also present 
estimates of alpha  for the sub-periods July 1995-September 2000 and October 2000-
December 2005, where each sub-sample contains 63 observations. 
 
2.4 Normality of returns 
 
To test for normality of the original and weighted return series, we apply the Doornik and 
Hansen (1994) normality test, which is more reliable in small samples than the common 
Bera-Jarque asymptotic test. 
 
Table A3 of the annex shows that, at the 99% confidence level, normality is rejected for six 
out of nine traditional market indices and nine out of eleven hedge fund indices when outliers 
are not accommodated. In contrast, after the influence of outliers is reduced, normality is 
only rejected for one traditional market index (US Treasury bill) and three hedge fund indices 
(Convertible arbitrage, Fixed income arbitrage, and Global macro). The large majority of the 
traditional and hedge fund weighted indices follow the normal distribution. Except for three 
particular hedge fund strategies, the necessary conditions for mean-variance optimisation are 
thus fulfilled. 
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2.5 Robust Sharpe ratios 
 
Furthermore, Sharpe ratios can be used to compare risk-adjusted performance on a stand-
alone basis across those indices that are normal. Table 1 shows Sharpe ratios of weighted 
return indices, where excess performance is measured against the US Treasury bill index. 
 
Over the period July 1995 – December 2005, on a stand-alone basis, most hedge fund indices 
outperformed most of the traditional market indices. Ignoring the non-normal hedge fund 
indices (i.e. Convertible arbitrage, Fixed income arbitrage, and Global macro), Table 1 
reveals that five hedge indices (i.e., Broad hedge, Equity market neutral, Event driven, 
Long/short equity and Multi-strategy) have higher Sharpe ratios than all traditional market 
indices (ignoring the US Treasury bill index). One hedge index (Emerging markets) beats six 
of the traditional indices whereas, in contrast, two hedge indices (Dedicated short bias and 
Managed futures) under-perform the traditional market indices. 
 
Most professional investors, however, hold well-diversified portfolios of both stocks and 
bonds. For these investors, the intriguing question is not so much whether hedge fund indices 
have higher Sharpe ratios but whether hedge funds may add value to well-diversified 
portfolios of stocks and bonds? In other words, does the hedge fund industry deliver alpha? 
 
 
Table 1: Robust risk-adjusted performance estimates of stand-alone traditional market 
and hedge fund indices over the period July 1995-December 2005 
Series Mean  (in  %)
2  St. deviation
3  Sharpe ratio
4 
Traditional Market Indices 
S&P 500  9.8  51.1  0.12 
S&P 400 midcap  15.2  56.2  0.20 
S&P 600 smallcap  14.4  60.3  0.18 
Technology PSE-ArcaEx Tech 100 (NYSE)  18.4  99.4  0.15 
Bloomberg real estate investment trust  9.0  43.0  0.12 
S&P/IFC emerging market  9.5  67.0  0.09 
US Treasury bill, 3-months, total return  3.8*  1.9*   
US Treasury bond, 10-year, total return  7.1  24.8  0.13 
US industrial bond Baa1, 10-year, total return  8.5  20.7  0.23 
Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Indices 
Broad hedge  12.3  25.5  0.33 
Convertible arbitrage  10.7*  12.2*  0.57* 
Dedicated short bias  -2.6  57.8  -0.11 
Emerging markets  12.1  42.5  0.20 
Equity market neutral  10.0  8.8  0.71 
Event driven  13.0  14.2  0.65 
Fixed income arbitrage  7.9*  8.3*  0.49* 
Global macro  15.7*  37.8*  0.32* 
Long/short equity  12.6  29.5  0.30 
Managed futures  7.1  40.9  0.08 
Multi-strategy  10.1  11.2  0.57 
1 Non-normal (at the 1% significance level) weighted returns are indicated with an asterisk.
 
2 Annualised mean of weighted monthly returns (in %) 
3 Annualised standard deviation of weighted monthly returns (in %) 
4  Sharpe ratio of weighted monthly returns   9
3. Defining alpha 
 
Let  t R  be a n-dimensional column-vector that contains the returns of n traditional assets in 
period t ) ,.., 1 ( T t = ,  s be a n-dimensional row-vector of portfolio shares for n traditional 
assets ) ,.., 1 ( n i = ,  S  be a n-dimensional row-vector of optimal portfolio shares, and Σ be 
the variance-covariance matrix of return vector  t R . Similarly, let 
*
t R  be a  1 + n -dimensional 
column-vector that contains the returns of the n traditional assets  ) ,.., 1 ( n i = and the new 
asset ( 1 + = n i , which in our case is a hedge fund index), 
* s  be a  1 + n -dimensional row-
vector of portfolio shares, 
* S  be a  1 + n -dimensional row-vector of optimal portfolio shares, 
and 
* Σ  be the variance-covariance matrix of return vector 
*
t R . 
 
It is common practice to measure the excess performance of a financial asset with returns  t r   
) ,.., 1 ( T t =  by the constant, commonly referred to as alpha, of a factor-pricing model. For 
example, a commonly used one-factor model is: 
 
t t t t t rf rm rf r ε β α + − + = − ) ( ) (    (3) 
 
where  t rf  is the return on a risk-free asset,  t rm  is the return on the market portfolio, and  t ε  
is the error term. 
 
The traditional alpha is not a risk-free measure. To see this, suppose that hedge fund returns 
have zero risk-factor sensitivities (i.e.  0 = β ). In this case, alpha would be computed as the 
difference in average returns between the hedge fund index and the risk-free asset without 
any correction for the risk of hedge fund index returns. The constant of factor pricing models 
measures factor-risk-adjusted performance, which ignores unexplained return volatility. 
 
We propose to measure excess performance by the difference between, on the one hand, the 
average return on a mean-variance efficient portfolio containing exclusively traditional 
market assets (such as stocks and bonds), and, on the other hand, the average return on a 
mean-variance efficient portfolio containing traditional market assets and the new asset (such 
as a hedge fund index), where both portfolios carry the same risk. We include the least risky 
asset, which in our case is the US Treasury bill index, when optimising the portfolios. 
 
Figure 2 below illustrates our definition of alpha. Alpha is equal to the vertical distance 
between the solid hyperbola of frontier portfolios of traditional assets and the dashed 
hyperbola of frontier portfolios that include the new asset. We note that alpha  is not 
necessarily the same for each risk level. 
 
More specifically, let σ  be a pre-specified risk level. Then, conditioned on σ , alpha is 
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Alpha in (4) is a total-risk-adjusted excess performance measure. 
 
Notice that we impose the restriction of positive portfolio weights, which would be justified 
for investors who cannot go short in the selected asset classes. Furthermore, we assume that 
investors pursue static long-term investment strategies. This implies that portfolio weights 
can be kept constant across different periods. For many pension fund investors and 
individuals for instance these two assumptions are appropriate. 
 
In principle, alpha can be significantly different from zero for the following reasons. Firstly, 




σ [SR]   11
and, as a consequence, may deliver diversification benefits. Secondly, hedge funds may 
exploit inefficiencies in asset prices by trading successfully on price corrections of these 
assets. Thirdly, in comparison to traditional investment companies, hedge funds may work at 
lower operating cost, and may be less restricted in investment choices (e.g. short selling), 
because they are less regulated. 
 




4. Measuring alpha 
 
Before looking at alpha, we briefly discuss the optimal portfolio weights. We begin our 
analysis by considering an investor who sets portfolio risk at the level of the corresponding 
stand-alone hedge index. Then, other strategies are considered that are more or less risky. 
 
Table A4 of the annex shows mean-variance efficient portfolios of traditional market indices 
where each portfolio carries the same risk as the corresponding stand-alone hedge index. For 
example, the performance of the broad hedge index is measured with respect to a portfolio of 
traditional assets where 41.7% is invested in the S&P 400 midcap index, 0.7% is invested in 
the PSE-ArcaEx Tech 100 index and 57.6% in the US industrial Baa1 bond index. The 
variance of the monthly returns of this portfolio and the variance of the broad hedge index 
returns are both equal to 4.5. The presented optimal portfolios all contain between two and 
four asset classes. Thus, it is not necessary to include all nine traditional fund indices in a 
well-diversified portfolio. Portfolios with a relatively low risk level, such as the portfolio at 
the risk level of the fixed income arbitrage strategy, put a relatively high weight on the 
Treasury bill index whereas portfolios with a relatively high risk level, such as the portfolio 
at the risk level of the dedicated short bias strategy, put a higher weight on the PSE-ArcaEx 
Tech index. The S&P 400 midcap index and the US industrial Baa1 bond index have 
important shares in most portfolios, which is not a surprise given their relatively high Sharpe 
ratios among the traditional fund indices (see Table 1). 
 
Mean-variance efficient portfolios that possibly include the traditional market indices and the 
hedge index under scrutiny are shown in Table A5 of the Annex. Except for the dedicated 
short bias strategy and the managed futures strategy, the hedge indices have an important 
share in the optimal portfolios. In one case, i.e. the event driven strategy, the optimal 
portfolio only consists of the hedge index. But, how much value do hedge funds add to the 
portfolios shown in Table A4? 
 
Table 2 reveals that the hedge fund industry in the aggregate (measured by the broad hedge 
fund index) did not deliver significant alpha between 1995 and 2005. Over the full sample 
period, annualised alpha was 1.1% for the broad hedge index (first row, first column) but not 
significantly different from zero at the 95%-confidence level. For the broad hedge index, 
alpha was neither significant for the sub-periods July 1995 – September 2000 (4.0%, second 
column) and October 2000 – December 2005 (-1.8%, third column). Thus, although the 
optimal portfolio with the hedge index (in the first row of Table A5) consists for about three-
quarters of hedge funds, the portfolio does not significantly outperform the corresponding 
traditional portfolio (in the first row of Table A4). 
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Table 2: Robust Alpha measured at the risk level of the corresponding hedge index
1,2 
Hedge fund strategy  Jul 1995 - Dec 2005 Jul 1995 - Sept 2000 Oct 2000 - Dec 2005














































































1 This table shows the difference between the average return of a mean-variance efficient portfolio of traditional 
market indices (excluding hedge fund indices) and a mean-variance efficient portfolio that may include the 
corresponding hedge fund index. Alpha is annualised. 
2 T-statistics are within parentheses, alpha’s that are significantly different from zero at the 95%-confidence 
level are shown in bold. 
3 Mean-variance efficient portfolios do not include the dedicated short bias index and the managed futures 
index. Inclusion of these indices would lead to a negative alpha. 
 
Table 3: Robust Alpha by risk level for the broad Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge index
1,2 
Variance of monthly 
portfolio returns 
Jul 1995 - Dec 2005
 
Jul 1995 - Sept 2000
 













































1 This table shows the difference between the average return of a mean-variance efficient portfolio of traditional 
market indices (excluding hedge fund indices) and a mean-variance efficient portfolio that may include the 
broad hedge fund index.
  Alpha is annualised. 
2 T-statistics are within parentheses.   13
Turning to the sub-groups of hedge fund strategies in Table 2, but ignoring the convertible 
arbitrage, fixed income arbitrage and global macro strategies due to their non-normality, we 
find that some hedge fund styles (i.e. equity market neutral, event driven and multi-strategy) 
delivered a significantly positive alpha. However, none of the over-performers of the first 
period provided significant alpha in the second period (between October 2000 and December 
2005). In contrast, the under-performers of the first period improved their results in the 
second period as their contribution was not any longer significantly negative. That said, none 
of the investment strategies provided significant alpha in the second period. These results are 
in accordance with Fung et al. (2006) who find that, between January 1995 and December 
2004, the average fund-of-hedge funds only delivered alpha in the period from October 1998 
to March 2000. 
 
So far we have computed alpha conditional on the risk of the corresponding hedge index.  In 
principle, significant alphas  could possibly occur at other risk levels. Table 3 shows 
estimates of alpha for the broad hedge index at various risk levels in order to check the 
robustness of our findings.
2 We let the risk (= variance) of the optimal portfolio vary from 1 
to 11. Notice that the variance of the monthly broad hedge index (weighted) returns is 4.5. 
Therefore, we consider both less risky and more risky portfolios than the broad hedge index 
on a stand-alone basis. Alpha is found significant in none of the investigated cases presented 
in Table 3. Alpha is actually lower at the extremes of the risk interval than at mid-levels. We 
conclude that the hedge fund industry in the aggregate did not deliver alpha at a wide range 
of risk levels. 
 
Finally, we also computed non-robust alphas (not shown) by comparing the non-weighted 
returns of the optimal portfolios. Now, except for the portfolio optimisation stage, outliers are 






Hedge funds advocate that their alternative investment strategies lead to excess returns, 
which are little correlated to the traditional markets. If hedge fund returns indeed have low 
factor sensitivities in classical asset pricing models, while carrying substantially more risk 
than the risk-free asset, then the conventional alpha can be a misleading measure of excess 
performance because it ignores the unexplained return volatility. 
 
Based on the total-risk-adjusted performance measure developed in this paper, the hedge 
fund industry in the aggregate did not deliver on their claim to bring additional benefits to 
investors who hold well-diversified portfolios across traditional asset classes. Some of the 
hedge fund strategies delivered significant alpha between July 1995 and September 2000 but 
none of them kept up with their excess performance in the five years that followed. The 
broad Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund index did not deliver significant alpha between 




                                                       
2 Table A6 and Table A7 of the Annex show the corresponding optimal portfolio weights.   14
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Annex 
 
Table A1: Bloomberg ticker codes 
Series Bloomberg  Ticker 
Traditional Market Indices 
S&P 500  SPX 
S&P 400 midcap  MID 
S&P 600 smallcap  SML 
Technology PSE-ArcaEx Tech 100 (NYSE)  PSE 
Bloomberg real estate investment trust  BBREIT 
S&P/IFC emerging market  IDRGCOPD 
US Treasury bill, 3-months, total return  F0823MR 
US Treasury bond, 10-year, total return  F08210YR 
US industrial bond Baa1, 10-year, total return  F00810YR 
Hedge Fund Indices 
Broad hedge  HEDGNAV 
Convertible arbitrage  HEDGCONV 
Dedicated short bias  HEDGDEDS 
Emerging markets  HEDGEMGM 
Equity market neutral  HEDGNEUT 
Event driven  HEDGDRIV 
Fixed income arbitrage  HEDGFIAR 
Global macro  HEDGGLMA 
Long/short equity  HEDGLSEQ 
Managed futures  HEDGFUTR 
Multi-strategy  HEDGMSTR 
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Table A2: Number of extreme observations
1 
Series  Number of observations 
receiving a weight < 1 
Minimum weight
2 
Traditional Market Indices 
S&P 500  3  0.63 
S&P 400 midcap  3  0.54 
S&P 600 smallcap  3  0.59 
Technology PSE-ArcaEx Tech 100 (NYSE)  5  0.7 
Bloomberg real estate investment trust  5  0.51 
S&P/IFC emerging market  5  0.44 
US Treasury bill, 3-months, total return  0  1 
US Treasury bond, 10-year, total return  3  0.62 
US industrial bond Baa1, 10-year, total return  5  0.52 
Hedge Fund Indices 
Broad hedge  6  0.56 
Convertible arbitrage  14  0.33 
Dedicated short bias  3  0.49 
Emerging markets  9  0.3 
Equity market neutral  6  0.65 
Event driven  6  0.2 
Fixed income arbitrage  18  0.16 
Global macro  1  0.68 
Long/short equity  8  0.42 
Managed futures  4  0.8 
Multi-strategy  4  0.37 
1 In a series of 126 monthly observations between July 1995 and December 2005. 
2 Outlying observations are weighted based on their distance to the Minimum Volume Ellipsoide (MVE) 
estimate of location. 
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Table A3: Doornik & Hansen (1994) normality test results
1 
Series  Original series  Weighted series
2 
Traditional Market Indices 
S&P 500  6.35  3.52 
S&P 400 midcap  8.77  0.76 
S&P 600 smallcap  9.22  1.59 
Technology PSE-ArcaEx Tech 100 (NYSE)  0.69  0.50 
Bloomberg real estate investment trust  10.41  0.08 
S&P/IFC emerging market  13.21  1.53 
US Treasury bill, 3-months, total return  20.46  20.46 
US Treasury bond, 10-year, total return  3.27  0.63 
US industrial bond Baa1, 10-year, total return  8.77  3.08 
Hedge Fund Indices 
Broad hedge  25.01  7.43 
Convertible arbitrage  42.79  9.05 
Dedicated short bias  13.84  5.78 
Emerging markets  45.83  1.92 
Equity market neutral  4.21  0.43 
Event driven  156.36  4.21 
Fixed income arbitrage  208.47  24.14 
Global macro  34.09  18.72 
Long/short equity  45.93  0.17 
Managed futures  0.96  0.01 
Multi-strategy  30.38  1.15 
1 The normality test statistic is approximately chi-squared distributed with two degrees of freedom, 
, 99 . 5 ) 2 (
2
95 . 0 = Χ   82 . 7 ) 2 (
2
99 . 0 = Χ . 
2 Outlying observations are weighted based on their distance to the Minimum Volume Ellipsoide (MVE) 
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Table A4: Mean-variance efficient portfolios of traditional market indices (excluding hedge fund indices), over the period July 1995 – 
December 2005, measured at the risk level of the corresponding hedge index 






































Broad hedge  0  41.7  0  0.7  0  0  0  0  57.6 
Convertible arbitrage  0  14  0  0  3  0  37  0  46 
Dedicated short bias  0  93  0  7  0  0  0  0  0 
Emerging markets  0  70  0  4  0  0  0  0  26 
Equity market neutral  0  10  0  0  2  0  55  0  33 
Event driven  0  16.9  0  0  3.5  0  26.4  0  53.2 
Fixed income arbitrage  0  10  0  0  2  0  57  0  31 
Global macro  0  63  0  3  0  0  0  0  34 
Long/short equity  0  49  0  2  0  0  0  0  49 
Managed futures  0  67.6  0  3.9  0  0  0  0  28.5 
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Table A5: Mean-variance efficient portfolios that possibly include the traditional market indices and the hedge fund index, over the 
period July 1995 – December 2005, measured at the risk level of the corresponding hedge index 




















































Broad hedge  0  15.6  0  0  0  0  0  0  6.8  77.6 
Convertible arbitrage  0  10  0  0  0  0  0  0  6  84 
Dedicated short bias  0  93  0  7  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Emerging markets  0  61.8  0  2.7  0  0  0  0  13.6  21.9 
Equity market neutral  0  2  1  0  0  0  0  0  6  91 
Event driven  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  100 
Fixed income arbitrage  0  7  0  0  0  0  0  0  18  75 
Global macro  0  1  0  16  0  0  0  0  0  83 
Long/short equity  0  17  0  0  0  0  0  0  8  75 
Managed futures  0  67.6  0  3.9  0  0  0  0  28.5  0 
Multi-strategy  0  8.4  0  0  0  0  0  0  10.3  81.3 
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Table A6: Mean-variance efficient portfolios of traditional market indices (excluding hedge fund indices), over the period July 1995 – 
December 2005, by risk level 
Variance of monthly 






































1  0  14  0  0  3  0  38  0  45 
3  0  29.6  0  0  0.7  0  0  0  69.7 
5  0  44  0  1  0  0  0  0  55 
7  0  53  0  2  0  0  0  0  45 
9  0  60  0  3  0  0  0  0  37 
11  0  66  0  4  0  0  0  0  30 
 
Table A7: Mean-variance efficient portfolios of traditional market indices and the broad hedge fund index, over the period July 1995 – 
December 2005, by risk level 
Variance of monthly 




















































1  0  4.8  0  0  3.1  0  33.6  0  28.9  29.6 
3  0  11.7  0  0  0  0  0  0  29  59.3 
5  0  17  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  82 
7  0  29  0  4  0  0  0  0  0  67 
9  0  32.5  0  8.9  0  0  0  0  0  58.6 
11  0  35  0  13  0  0  0  0  0  52 
 